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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a navigation scheme that
utilizes the online road information collected by a vehicular ad
hoc network (VANET) to guide the drivers to desired destinations
in a real-time and distributed manner. The proposed scheme
has the advantage of using real-time road conditions to compute
a better route and at the same time, the information source
can be properly authenticated. To protect the privacy of the
drivers, the query (destination) and the driver who issues the
query are guaranteed to be unlinkable to any party including
the trusted authority. We make use of the idea of anonymous
credential to achieve this goal. In addition to authentication
and privacy-preserving, our scheme fulfills all other necessary
security requirements. Using the real maps of New York and
California, we conducted a simulation study on our scheme
showing that it is effective in terms of processing delay and
providing routes of much shorter travelling time.
Index Terms—Navigation, secure vehicular sensor network,
signature verification, pseudo identity, anonymous credential,
proxy re-encryption
I. INTRODUCTION
Finding a route to a certain destination is a common
experience for all drivers. In the old days, a driver usually
refers to a hardcopy of the atlas. The drawbacks are quite
obvious. With the introduction of Global Positioning System
(GPS) [1], GPS-based navigation systems become popular. [2]
is an example. In such a system, a small hardware device is
installed on a vehicle. By receiving GPS signals, the device can
determine its current location and then find the geographically
shortest route to a certain destination based on a local map
database. However, the route searching procedure of these
systems is based on a local map database and real-time road
conditions are not taken into account.
To learn about real-time road conditions, a driver needs
another system known as Traffic Message Channel (TMC) [3]
which has been adopted in a number of developed countries.
TMC makes use of FM radio data system to broadcast real-
time traffic and weather information to drivers. A special
equipment is required to decode or to filter the information
received. However, only special road conditions (e.g. severe
taffic accident) are broadcasted and a driver cannot obtain
information like the general fluency of a road from TMC.
Recently, vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) becomes
increasingly popular in many countries. It is an important
element of the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) [4]. In
a typical VANET, each vehicle is assumed to have an on-board
unit (OBU) and there are road-side units (RSU) installed along
the roads. A trusted authority (TA) and maybe some other
application servers are installed in the backend. The OBUs and
RSUs communicate using the Dedicated Short Range Commu-
nications (DSRC) protocol [5] over the wireless channel while
the RSUs, TA, and the application servers communicate using
a secure fixed network (e.g. the Internet). The basic application
of a VANET is to allow arbitrary vehicles to broadcast safety
messages (e.g. vehicle speed, turning direction, traffic accident
information) to other nearby vehicles (denoted as vehicle-
vehicle or V2V communications) and to RSU (denoted as
vehicle-infrastructure or V2I communications) regularly such
that other vehicles may adjust their travelling routes and RSUs
may inform the traffic control center to adjust traffic lights for
avoiding possible traffic congestion. As such, a VANET can
also be interpreted as a sensor network because the traffic
control center or some other central servers can collect lots
of useful information about road conditions from vehicles. It
is natural to investigate how to utilize the collected real-time
road conditions to provide useful applications.
In this paper, we propose a new application - VANET-based
Secure and Privacy-preserving Navigation (VSPN) which
makes use of the collected data to provide navigation service
to drivers. Based on the destination and the current location of
the driver (the query), the system can automatically search for
a route which yields minimum travelling delay in a distributed
manner using the online information of the road condition.
In addition of driving guidance, the navigation results can
also be used for other purposes. For example, a recent work
[6] proposed to use the returned routes for opportunistically
routing multimedia information such as images and videos
about a desired scene to vehicles.
Like other communication networks, security issues have
been widely addressed in VANETs. Any navigation scheme
must also satisfy these security requirements. First, whether
or not the service is free, subscription to the service is usually
required. A user (note that since the user is usually the driver
and it is associated with the vehicle, we use these terms
interchangeably throughout the paper) must be authenticated
to ensure he is a valid subscriber. Messages sent in the system
must be authenticated and signed to make sure that they were
not modified by anyone.
On the other hand, since a vehicle’s OBU will continuously
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2communicate with RSUs, the driving habit of a driver as well
as the travelling routes can be easily analyzed. So, privacy
protection is another basic requirement in VANETs. One
common approach to resolve this possible privacy leakage is
to use a different authenticable, but unrelated pseudo identity
to communicate with a different RSU. Thus, collecting all
messages between a vehicle and all RSUs cannot link the
messages together to reconstruct the driving routes or analyze
the driving habit of a driver. However, to protect the system,
for example, if a subscriber launches a denial-of-service attack
to the system by sending out many messages to an RSU in a
short period of time, the system administrator should be able
to trace that user and to block its further access to protect the
system. Therefore, though pseudo identity is used, a trusted
party (e.g. TA) should be able to obtain a user’s real identity if
necessary. In other words, the real identity of a vehicle should
be kept anonymous from other vehicles as well as RSUs and
anyone (including all RSUs) cannot reveal the real identify of
a vehicle by analyzing multiple messages sent by it. But the
authorized party (TA) is able to retrieve the real identity of
the sender if needed based on its pseudo identity.
For a VANET-based navigation system, we need additional
security and privacy requirements which make the problem
non-trivial. In a basic VANET system, the trusted authority
has the power to reveal the real identity of a vehicle. If the
navigation system is not carefully designed, it means that the
real identity of a driver and the query issued by him can be
easily linked up and analyzed. While we still want the TA to
have the authority to reveal the real identity based on a pseudo
identity, we want to ensure that the TA does not know where
the driver wants to go.
Basic confidentiality is another important factor in our
scheme. First, a driver may not want vehicles nearby to know
his/her destination by eavesdropping his/her query issued.
Second, when the system sends the navigation result back to
him/her, we do not want non-subscribers nearby to enjoy free
navigation service in case it is going to the same destination,
in order to protect the profit of the operator if the service
is a charged item. Moreover, since navigation involves the
information (including locations and road conditions) provided
by more than one RSU and RSUs are left unattended at
roadsides most of the time, proper authentication of this
information becomes critical. Moreover, the authentication
must be efficient, otherwise, the querying duration will be
unacceptably long.
To summarize, our VSPN scheme adopts some security
primitives in a non-trivial way to provide the following secu-
rity features: 1) When using the navigation service, a vehicle
can be properly authenticated. Privacy is preserved using the
idea of pseudo identity. At the same time, the vehicle’s real
identity can be traced if necessary. 2) Navigation queries and
results are protected to preserve user’s confidentiality and
operator’s profit. On the other hand, one’s real identity and
navigation query are completely delinked using the idea of
anonymous credential. 3) Information provided by RSUs can
be properly authenticated in an efficient way.
We provide a security analysis and a simulation study to
evaluate our scheme. Through the simulation, we find that a
query can be completed (fulfilling all security requirements)
in a reasonable amount of time. Also our scheme can lead to
a savings of up to 55% in travelling time when compared
with offline route searching approaches which do not take
into account the real road conditions. Finally, through a partial
implementation, we show that batch verification of signatures
in RSUs is not desirable in our scheme as opposed to what
was suggested in works like [7].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: related work
is reviewed in Section II. The system model and the problem
statement are described in Section III. Some preliminaries are
given in Section IV. Our schemes are presented in Section
V. The analysis and evalution of our schemes are given in
Sections VI, VII and VIII. The approach of batch verification
is discussed in IX. Finally, Section X concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The idea of real-time navigation using VANET is not totally
new. A similar scheme is proposed in a recent work [8]. How-
ever, there are a number of differences between their scheme
and ours. First, their scheme is of a small scale which covers
a carpark while ours is large scale to cover the whole city and
beyond. Second, in their scheme a carpark is monitored by
three RSUs which take up the roles of determining a vehicle’s
location, searching for a vacant parking space and providing
navigation service to guide the vehicle to go from the carpark
entrance to the selected parking space. In our scheme, the
road system in the city is monitored by a large number of
RSUs which take up the navigation task in a distributed
manner. Third, in terms of security functions, their scheme
assumes RSUs to be fully trusted. This makes sense since the
three RSUs are installed indoors and can be monitored by
security guards. However, such an assumption is no longer
valid in our outdoor setting. It is impossible to have security
guards monitor all RSUs across the city. Thus, unlike their
scheme, authentication of RSUs becomes a vital component in
ours. Fourth, our scheme allows one’s identity and navigation
query to be delinked. This feature is only interesting for wide
area navigation like ours. Thus, the scheme provided in [8]
cannot be used to solve the navigation problem discussed in
this paper. Besides, an application of real-time navigation is
proposed in another recent work [6]. In addition to driving
guidance, the returned routes are used for opportunistically
routing multimedia information such as images and videos of
a desired scene to vehicles.
Our scheme is based on the idea of indistinguishable
(anonymous) credential. Such a credential system was intro-
duced by Chaum [9]. The system allows a user to obtain
a credential from one organization and later show the pos-
session of the credential to another organization while the
transactions at the two organizations are not linkable. The
idea of anonymous credential has been adopted in different
applications. For example, [10] proposes a credential-based
privacy-preserving e-learning system under which a student
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTERS
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication.
3can show his/her progress in e-learning without leaking his/her
identity information.
In fact, VANET security is a hot research topic. Security
issues and challenges of VANETs have recently been summa-
rized by [11]. As early as 2007, a scheme called AMOEBA
[12] was proposed to provide location privacy based on the
concept of vehicle group navigation. In 2008, a number of
works including [7], [13] and [14] were published to address
different security issues in VANETs. In [7], a batch verification
scheme known as IBV was proposed for an RSU to verify a
large number of signatures at the same time using only three
pairing operations. The scheme relies on a tamper-proof device
to store an unchangeable master secret key. However, it can be
expected that such a tamper-proof device will be compromised
eventually (e.g. Infineon Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs)
were compromised a few months ago [15]). And once one
tamper-proof device is compromised, the whole system will
be compromised. Thus in our VSPN scheme, we enable the
master secret key to be updated regularly via RSUs, yet the
RSUs still have no knowledge of it by means of the property
of proxy re-encryption. In [13], an RSU-aided inter-vehicle
communications scheme was proposed. A vehicle relies on an
RSU to verify the signature of another vehicle. In [14], group
communications in VANETs are considered and a group key
update protocol was proposed.
In 2009, some security and privacy-enhancing communica-
tions schemes were proposed in [16]. Of particular interest, a
group communications protocol was defined. After a simple
handshaking with any RSU, a group of known vehicles can
verify the signature of each other without any further support
from RSUs. A common group secret is also developed for
secure communications among group members. In the same
year, a strategy was formulated for pseudonym update to
sustain privacy when a vehicle is being observed by an
adversary who has different capabilities [17]. Results show that
by adopting the pseudonym update strategy, the privacy of a
vehicle can be maximized. Recently in 2011, two more related
works [18] and [19] were published. In [18], an efficient
self-generated pseudonym mechanism based on Identity-Based
Encryption (IBE) was proposed for protecting drivers’ privacy.
In [19], an efficient social-tier-assisted packet forwarding
protocol STAP for achieving receiver-location privacy preser-
vation in VANETs was proposed. The authors proposed to
deploy storage-rich RSUs at social spots and let them form a
virtual social tier. In this way, without knowing the receiver’s
exact location, a packet for him/her can first be forwarded and
disseminated in the social tier concerned. Once the receiver
visits one of social spots at a later time, he/she can receive
the packet successfully.
Other recent efforts include [20] and [21]. These two works
also target at driver privacy preservation but instead of using
pseudo identities, the concept of group signature is adopted.
The signature of any vehicle can be verified by the same group
key but the actual signer can only be traced by a trusted party.
Though privacy can be preserved, these schemes are rather
complicated and may not be practical.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System Model and Assumptions
Recall that a vehicular network consists of on-board units
(OBUs) installed on vehicles, road-side units (RSUs) along the
roads, and a trusted authority (TA). We assume the following:
1) TA is trusted but curious. It performs cryptographic
operations such as key generation honestly but is curious
about drivers’ privacy such as navigation queries. To
avoid being a single point of failure, redundant TAs
which have identical functionalities and databases are
installed.
2) TA and tamper-proof devices on vehicles are assumed
to be trusted for the generation and management of
anonymous credentials.
3) RSUs are not trusted and curious. Since they are placed
along roadside, they can be easily compromised. Also
they are curious about drivers’ privacy such as naviga-
tion queries.
4) RSUs and TA communicate through a secure fixed
network (e.g. Internet).
5) There exists a conventional public key infrastructure
(PKI) for initial vehicle authentication. Each vehicle Vi
having license plate number LPi has a conventional
public key CPKi and a conventional private key CSKi
and is given a TA-signed certificate Certi which con-
tains CPKi and LPi. We will discuss details about the
generation and verification of Certi in Section V.
6) There also exists a conventional identity-based public
key infrastructure (PKI) for TA and RSU authentication.
The public key of the TA is the same as its real identity
TRID and is known by everyone. Also any RSU Ri
broadcasts its public key which is the same as its
real identity RRIDi with hello messages periodically
to vehicles that are travelling within its RSU-Vehicle
Communications (RVC) range. Thus RRIDi is known
by all vehicles nearby. The validity of RRIDi can be
ensured using a certificate issued by the TA. We will
discuss the details in Section V.
7) The real identity of any vehicle is only known by the
TA and itself but not by others.
8) We assume that there is a reasonably large number of
navigation queries issued to RSUs. Otherwise, if there
is only one navigation query, the sender can be linked
up with the query easily.
9) Each RSU has a local database storing road information
in its range (e.g. GPS locations of boundaries, and
names of buildings and streets) and how to get to its
neighboring RSUs (e.g. distance and direction).
10) Each vehicle has a tamper-proof device which is re-
sponsible for all cryptographic-related functions such as
storage of keys, generation of pseudo identities, signing
messages and encryption of messages (details will be
given one by one in the next section). Also its output
interface is limited and we will specify that in the appro-
priate places in the next section. Finally, it is assumed
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4to have its own clock for generating correct time stamps
and be able to run on its own battery [22]. Note that
a vehicle can also have a conventional computer device
for performing the verification of RSUs’ hop information
(to speed up the process and details will be given in the
next section).
11) TA, RSUs and vehicle tamper-proof devices have
roughly synchronized clocks. This can be done easily
by requiring TA to periodically broadcast the current
time to all vehicle tamper-proof devices via RSUs.
B. Adversary Model
We assume that an adversary is capable of performing the
following without our VSPN scheme:
1) An adversary can issue or even impersonate any vehicle
to issue navigation query into the system.
2) An adversary can trace the real identity of any vehicle
and can reveal a vehicle’s real identity by analysing
multiple messages sent by it.
3) An adversary can obtain the content of any navigation
query and navigation result by means of eavesdropping.
4) An adversary can link up a vehicle’s query with its real
identity by colluding with RSUs and TA.
Thus we aim at designing a scheme to prevent all these from
happening.
C. Security Requirements
We aim at designing a scheme to provide VANET-based
navigation to satisfy the following security requirements:
1) Message integrity and authentication: A vehicle should
be authenticated before it can issue a navigation query.
On the other hand, an RSU (vehicle) is able to verify
that a message is indeed sent and signed by a certain
vehicle (RSU) without being modified by anyone.
2) Identity privacy-preserving: The real identity of a vehicle
should be kept anonymous from other vehicles as well as
from RSUs and a third-party should not be able to reveal
a vehicle’s real identity by analysing multiple messages
sent by it.
3) Traceability: Although a vehicle’s real identity should
be hidden from other vehicles and RSUs, TA should
have the ability to obtain a vehicle’s real identity so
that the vehicle can be charged for using the navigation
service. Also TA has the role to maintain liability via
non-repudiation property of messages when accidents
happen on the road.
4) Confidentiality: The content of a query and that of
a navigation result should be kept confidential from
eavesdroppers.
5) Unlinkability: Even if all RSUs and TA collude, they
cannot link up a vehicle’s query with its real identity.
Note that there can be other kinds of attacks such as
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in a VANET envi-
ronment. However, there are already many existing techniques
such as [23] and so we do not make it our focus in this paper.
IV. PRELIMINARIES - BILINEAR MAPS
The section describes the concepts of bilinear maps and
proxy re-encryption schemes in details.
A. Bilinear Maps
Our security schemes are pairing-based and defined on two
cyclic groups with a mapping called bilinear map [24]. In this
subsection, we briefly introduce what a bilinear map is.
Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group with generator g and
GT be another. Both groups G and GT have the same prime
order q. The mapping eˆ : G × G → GT is called a bilinear
map if it satisfies the following properties:
1) Bilinear: ∀g1, g2, g3 ∈ G and ∀a, b ∈ Z, eˆ(g2, g1 · g3) =
eˆ(g1 · g3, g2) = eˆ(g1, g2) · eˆ(g3, g2). Also eˆ(ga1 , gb1) =
eˆ(g1, g
b
1)
a = eˆ(ga1 , g1)
b = eˆ(g1, g1)
ab
.
2) Non-degenerate: There exists g1, g2 ∈ G such that
eˆ(g1, g2) = 1GT .
3) Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm to com-
pute eˆ(g1, g2) for any g1, g2 ∈ G.
The bilinear map eˆ can be constructed using pairings on
elliptic curves. Each operation for computing eˆ(g1, g2) is
referred to as a pairing operation. Pairing operation is the most
expensive operation in this kind of cryptographic schemes. The
fewer the number of pairing operations, the more efficient
the scheme is. The groups G and GT are called bilinear
groups. The security of our schemes relies on the fact that
the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) on bilinear groups is
computationally hard, i.e., given the point g2 = ga1 , there
exists no efficient algorithm to obtain a given g1 and g2.
The implication is that we can transfer g2 in an open wireless
channel without worrying that a (usually some secret) can be
known by any attackers.
B. Proxy Re-encryption Schemes
In our VSPN scheme, we make use of the properties of
proxy re-encryption to let RSUs re-encrypt the most updated
master secret s to vehicles while at the same time the RSUs
do not know the value of s. In this subsection, we briefly
introduce the concept of proxy re-encryption.
A proxy re-encryption scheme is similar to a traditional
symmetric or asymmetric encryption scheme with the addition
of a delegation function. The message sender can generate a
re-encryption key based on his/her own secret key and the
delegated user’s key. A proxy can then use this re-encryption
key to translate a ciphertext into a special form such that
the delegated user can use his/her private key to decrypt the
ciphertext. Two representative proxy re-encryption schemes
can be found in [25] and [26].
The concept of proxy re-encryption is very useful in our
VSPN scheme. In our scheme, we adopt an asymmetric
approach. The TA first prepares a re-encryption key for each
vehicle. RSUs can then use the re-encryption key to translate
the encrypted master secret s into a form such that the vehicle
concerned can decrypt using its private key. In this way, the
master secret can be distributed by the RSUs while at the same
time, it is kept secret from the RSUs.
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5V. OUR SOLUTIONS - VSPN
This section presents our VANET-based Secure and Privacy-
preserving Navigation (VSPN) scheme. We first summarize
our scheme into some basic steps (see Fig. 1):
Fig. 1. Basic Steps in VSPN
1) TA sets up parameters and generates anonymous creden-
tials.
2) Vehicle Vi’s tamper-proof device starts up and requests
for the master secret s from RSU Rc.
3) Vehicle Vi’s tamper-proof device requests for a naviga-
tion credential from RSU Rj .
4) RSU Rj verifies Vi’s identity and sends its tamper-proof
device an anonymous credential.
5) After a random delay or after travelling for a random
distance, Vi’s tamper-proof device sends out its naviga-
tion request to RSU Rk.
6) RSU Rk forwards the navigation request to its neigh-
bors. This process repeats until the request reaches RSU
Rd covering the destination.
7) RSU Rd constructs the navigation reply message and
sends it along the reverse path. Each hop along the
path attaches the corresponding hop information (with
signature).
8) RSU Rk forwards the navigation reply message to Vi’s
tamper-proof device which then verifies the messages
from all RSUs along the route in a batch.
9) By presenting the navigation session number, each RSU
along the route guides Vi to reach the next RSU closer
to the destination.
10) Based on Vi’s pseudo identity received from RSU Rj ,
TA reveals Vi’s real identity for billing purpose.
Next we explain our scheme in details. The notations used
in this paper are summarized in Table I.
A. Setup by TA
During system startup, the following will be carried out by
TA.
• TA chooses G and GT that satisfy the bilinear map
properties.
• Let g be the generator of G. TA randomly picks s ∈ Zq
as the master secret and computes gpub = gs as a public
parameter. TA can update s and the corresponding gpub
at any time and the most updated s being encrypted using
TA’s public key (i.e. AS ENCTRID(s)) is broadcasted
TABLE I
NOTATIONS USED IN THIS PAPER
Symbol Meaning
G and GT Bilinear groups
g Generator of G
s System master secret
gpub = g
s Public parameter
TCPK Conventional public key of TA
TCSK Conventional private key of TA
TRID Identity of TA
TSK Secret key of TA s.t. TRID = gTSK
TSIGTSK(M) TA’s signature on message M using TSK
Ri RSU number i
RLi Location of RSU Ri
RCi Certificate of RSU Ri
RRIDi Identity of RSU Ri
RSKi Secret key of RSU Ri s.t. RRIDi = gRSKi
CT Anonymous credential for period T
Vi Vehicle number i
V Ci Certificate of vehicle Vi
CPKi Conventional public key of vehicle Vi
CSKi Conventional private key of vehicle Vi
REKi Re-encryption key for vehicle Vi
V RIDi Real identity of vehicle Vi
V PWDi Hardware activation password on Vi
V PIDi Pseudo identity of vehicle Vi
V SKi Signing key of vehicle Vi
S ENCx(M) Symmetrical encryption of M using key x
AS ENCx(M) Asymmetrical encryption of M using key x
SIGx(M) Signature on message M using key x
H(M) MapToPoint hash value [27] on message M
h(M) One-way hash value of message M
to all RSUs while the most updated gpub are made public.
Such an update does not need to be carried out frequently.
Instead, it is only needed when any vehicle unregisters
(i.e. a vehicle is no longer eligible to know the value of s)
or when any vehicle is proved to have been compromised
(i.e. the value of s is already disclosed to attackers). Note
that since s is encrypted using TA’s public key, RSUs
cannot know its value.
• TA assigns itself an identity TRID and sets its secret
key TSK such that TRID = gTSK . TRID is assumed
to be known by everyone in the system.
• TA also generates a pair of conventional public and
private keys, TCPK and TCSK , only used for master
key re-encryption purposes.
• For each RSU Ri located at RLi, TA performs the
following steps:
– TA assigns it an identity RRIDi and a secret key
RSKi such that RRIDi = gRSKi .
– TA then generates Ri’s certificate as RCi =<
RRIDi, RLi, TSIGTSK(RRIDi||RLi) > where
TSIGTSK(RRIDi||RLi) is TA’s signature on the
concatenation of RRIDi and RLi and is defined as
H(RRIDi||RLi)
TSK where H(.) is a MapToPoint
hash function [27].
• During the first registration of each vehicle Vi, TA
performs the following steps:
– TA assigns each vehicle Vi a real identity V RIDi
and a tamper-proof device activation password
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6V PWDi. V RIDi is defined as gx where x is a
random number. Note that TA does not need to keep
the value of x after generating V RIDi.
– TA also assigns each vehicle Vi a license plate
number LPi by coordinating with the transport de-
partment in the city.
– TA generates a pair of conventional public and
private keys, CPKi and CSKi respectively, for Vi.
– TA generates a re-encryption key REKi for Vi.
REKi is made from TA’s conventional secret key
TCSK and Vi’s conventional public and private
keys, CPKi and CSKi, so that by having it, RSUs
can translate a ciphertext encrypted using TA’s public
key TCPK to a new ciphertext being decryptable
by Vi.
– TA signs Vi’s certificate as V Ci =< LPi,
CPKi, REKi, TSIGTSK(LPi||CPKi||REKi) >
where TSIGTSK(LPi||CPKi||REKi) = H(LPi||
CPKi||REKi)
TSK
. Vehicle Vi can use V Ci for
initial authentication to obtain the most updated
master key s.
– TA preloads V RIDi, V PWDi, LPi, CSKi and
V Ci into the tamper-proof device of Vi.
Throughout the paper, conventional asymmetric and sym-
metric encryptions and signatures are used occasionally.
To make the context concise, let us use the notations
AS ENCx(M) and S ENCx(M), SIGx(M) to denote
asymmetrically encrypting, symmetrically encrypting and
signing message M using the key x based on any asymmetric
encryption, symmetric encryption , and signature algorithms,
respectively.
B. Generation of Anonymous Credentials by TA
As mentioned in Section I, our scheme is based on the idea
of anonymous credentials. Before we talk about how they are
used, let us explain how they are generated by TA.
In our scheme, a navigation credential will expire after a
predefined expiration period of time (e.g. a day). In other
words, the navigation credentials on different days are dif-
ferent. Thus even if an attacker breaks the system and obtains
a credential successfully, the impact to the system is limited.
Assume that we are now at time period T . TA performs two
simple operations:
• TA computes the credential for the current period as
CT =< NVC, T, TSIGTSK(NVC||T ) > where the
keyword NVC is used to denote that it is a navigation cre-
dential and TSIGTSK(NVC||T ) = H(NVC||T )TSK .
• TA sends S ENCs(CT ) to all RSUs securely via a fixed
infrastructure.
From the definition of CT , we can see that the credential
carries no information about any user and that is why we call
it ”anonymous”.
C. Activation and requesting for master key by vehicle tamper-
proof device
When the vehicle Vi starts, the driver enters the real identity
V RIDi and password V PWDi (assigned by TA in Section
V-A) into the tamper-proof device to activate it. Here only
simple hardware checking is involved. Two cases are possible
and the tamper-proof device reacts accordingly:
• If either the real identity or the password, or both are
incorrect, the tamper-proof device refuses to perform
further operations.
• If both the real identity and the password are correct, the
tamper-proof device signs a master key request message
as SIGCSKi(MK Req). It then sends < RRIDc, V Ci,
SIGCSKi(MK Req)> to an RSU Rc (with identity
RRIDc) nearby.
Upon receiving from Vi, RSU Rc performs the following
steps:
• It first verifies TA’s signature on the certificate
V Ci by checking whether the equality
eˆ(TSIGTSK (LPi||CPKi||REKi), g) =
eˆ(H(LPi||CPKi||REKi)
TSK , TRID) holds.
Proof of correctness:
eˆ(TSIGTSK(LPi||CPKi||REKi), g)
= eˆ(H(LPi||CPKi||REKi)
TSK , g)
= eˆ(H(LPi||CPKi||REKi), g
TSK)
= eˆ(H(LPi||CPKi||REKi), TRID) 
• If the TA’s signature is valid, it proceeds to verify Vi’s
signature SIGCSKi(MK Req) using the public key
CPKi as included in the certificate V Ci.
• If Vi’s signature is valid also, RSU Rc proceeds
to re-encrypt ASENCTRID(s) into ASENCCPKi(s)
using Vi’s re-encryption key REKi and sends <
CPKi, AS ENCCPKi(s) > to Vi.
Vi’s tamper-proof device can then use the private key
CSKi stored to decrypt and obtain s. Note that by default,
Vi’s temper-proof device does not provide any function for
outputting the values of CSKi or s. They are used for internal
operations only.
On the other hand, our VSPN scheme supports vehicle
revocation. The TA maintains a revocation list which contains
certificates of all revoked vehicles (e.g. those vehicles which
have been proved to have committed any kind of attacks to the
system). This revocation list is then broadcasted to all RSUs.
Having this mechanism, RSUs will not send the encrypted
master secret to revoked vehicles in order to protect the system.
D. Requesting for anonymous credential by vehicle tamper-
proof device
In order to obtain anonymous credentials, Vi’s tamper-proof
device performs the following steps:
• It first generates a pseudo identity V PIDi which is com-
posed of two parts V PIDi1 and V PIDi2 (or denoted
as (V PIDi1, V PIDi2)). These two parts are defined as
V PIDi1 = g
r and V PIDi2 = V RIDi ⊕ H(grpub),
where r is a per-session random nonce, respectively.
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7• It then composes the navigation credential request mes-
sage Mi = {NVC REQ}.
• It also picks a random number rand and encrypts it using
Rj’s identity as AS ENCRRIDj (rand). This random
number becomes a shared secret between itself and RSU
Rj . Rj will use it to encrypt the credential at a later
stage.
• Next it generates the signing key V SKi as
(V SKi1, V SKi2) = (V PID
s
i1, HP
s
i ) where
HPi = H(V PIDi1||V PIDi2).
• It generates its signature σi on Mi and Ti (Ti is the
current timestamp given by the tamper-proof device) as
V SKi1 × V SK
h(Mi||Ti)
i2 where h(.) is a one-way hash
function such as SHA-1 [28].
• Finally it sends < RRIDj, AS ENCRRIDj (rand),
V PIDi, Mi, Ti, σi > to RSU Rj nearby.
RSU Rj then performs the following steps:
• It first checks the timestamps in the messages. For any
message, if the difference between the attached timestamp
and the current time is larger than a threshold (which is a
system parameter), the message is ignored. This can help
reduce the impact of replay attack.
• It then verifies Vi’s signature by checking whether the
equality eˆ(σi, g) = eˆ(V PIDi1 ×HP h(Mi)i , gpub) holds.
Proof of correctness:
eˆ(σi, g)
= eˆ(V SKi1 × V SK
h(Mi)
i2 , g)
= eˆ(V PIDsi1 ×HP
sh(Mi)
i , g)
= eˆ(V PIDi1 ×HP
h(Mi)
i , g
s)
= eˆ(V PIDi1 ×HP
h(Mi)
i , gpub) 
• If Vi’s signature is valid, Rj encrypts the
encrypted anonymous credential for the current
period S ENCs(CT ) using rand and sends
< V PIDi, S ENCrand(S ENCs(CT )) > back to it.
Note again that rand provides a secure communications
channel between Rj and Vi.
Upon receiving S ENCrand(S ENCs(CT )), Vi’s tamper-
proof device decrypts it using rand and s in order and
stores the anonymous credential CT . Note that by default,
Vi’s temper-proof device does not provide any function for
outputting the anonymous credential CT and it is used for
composing messages only. This helps to prevent a vehicle
from illegally transferring an anonymous credential to another
unauthorized party.
E. Requesting for navigation service by vehicle tamper-proof
device
Next let us come to the core part of our scheme - requesting
for navigation service. Note that if Vi obtains the credential
CT from RSU Rj and if it sends out its navigation query
to Rj immediately, its real identity and its query may be
linked up if Rj colludes with TA (since TA can always
recover Vi’s real identity from its pseudo identity based on
our traceability requirement), especially when Vi is the only
vehicle which requests credential from Rj . We propose three
simple approaches to avoid this from happening:
1) Vi pre-requests a number of navigation credentials be-
fore they are being used. For example, if a driver knows
that he/she will require navigation service some time in
the day, he/she can pre-request an appropriate number
of navigation credentials early in the morning before the
vehicle starts any journey.
2) Vi sends out its navigation query to Rj only after a
random delay. This is because under normal situation,
there will be credential requests from other vehicles
during that random period and as a result Rj cannot link
up which query belongs to which credential request.
3) Vi sends out its navigation query at another RSU (say
Rk = Rj) after travelling for a random distance. Since
Rk does not know Vi’s credential request (thus pseudo
identity), even if it colludes with TA, it cannot link up
Vi’s real identity and its query.
Now without loss of generality, assume that Vi sends
its navigation request to RSU Rk. Vi’s tamper-proof device
performs the following steps:
• It first composes the navigation request message Mi =
{NV REQ, DEST } where DEST can be anything
representing the destination desired (e.g. GPS coordi-
nates).
• It picks a random number rand which is for Rk to
encrypt the navigation result at a later stage.
• It then requests TA for a navigation session number
nsn. To avoid the collision of navigation session num-
bers in different navigation instances, navigation session
numbers are centrally generated by TA. TA maintains
a list containing all used navigation session numbers.
Whenever TA is requested by any tamper-proof device
for a new navigation session number, TA randomly picks
one which is not on the list. TA also periodically flushes
the list by removing the earliest entries.
• It also retrieves CT from its local storage and sends
< RRIDk, AS ENCRRIDk(rand, nsn,CT ,Mi) > to
Rk.
• It then stores rand and nsn locally.
• After that Vi’s tamper-proof device deletes CT from its
storage so that a credential will not be used more than
once. In case the driver wants to make another navigation
request on the same day, he/she has to request for another
credential via its tamper-proof device and this in turn
leads to another service charge.
• Vi keeps the session alive with Rk until it receives the
navigation reply.
Upon receiving Vi’s request message, RSU Rk performs the
following:
• It decrypts the message using its private key.
• It ensures that the credential used CT is not outdated (e.g.
the timestamp should be within a pre-defined number of
expiration periods before the current time period).
• It then verifies TA’s signature on CT (having the for-
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8mat < NVC||T, TSIGTSK(NVC||T )>) by check-
ing whether eˆ(TSIGTSK(NVC||T ), g) is equal to
eˆ(H(NVC||T ), TRID).
Proof of correctness:
eˆ(TSIGTSK(NVC||T ), g)
= eˆ(H(NVC||T )TSK , g)
= eˆ(H(NVC||T ), gTSK)
= eˆ(H(NVC||T ), TRID) 
• If the signature is valid, it proceeds to the route searching
process.
• It stores rand and nsn locally for later use.
F. Navigation request and reply propagation among RSUs
In this sub-section, let us look at how Vi’s navigation query
is propagated across the network of RSUs and how the result is
sent back to Vi. RSU Rk takes up the role of initiating the route
searching process by composing the route request message
Mk = {RT REQ, nsn,RRIDk, DEST } and broadcasts it
to all neighbors which are closer to DEST than itself.
Any receiving RSU performs the following steps:
• It first stores nsn (the navigation session number),
RRIDk and DEST into its navigation routing table to
build up the reverse path so that it can send any reply
back to Rk later on.
• It then checks whether DEST is within its range.
• If DEST is not within its range, it simply re-broadcasts
Mk to all neighbors which are closer to DEST than
itself.
• If DEST is within its range, it computes the
route reply message Md = {RT RPY, nsn,
RRIDd, RLd, RCd, HopInfod} and sends it back
to its previous RSU hop. Here HopInfod =<
AvgSpdd, RoadCondd, σd >. AvgSpdd represents the
average vehicle speed in its range. Note that to better
reflect the flow status of a road, AvgSpdd is taken
as an average value over a pre-defined period (say 30
minutes). RoadCondd represents the summarized road
conditions in its range. The size of RoadCondd can be
very small since we can use some pre-agreed symbols
to represent common road conditions such as traffic jam,
collision, fire, etc. σd is Rd’s signature on the concate-
nation of AvgSpdd and RoadCondd and is defined as
H(AvgSpdd||RoadCondd)
RSKd
.
Each RSU hop along the reverse path Rim repeats the steps
done by Rd and includes information corresponding to its
hop (i.e. RRIDim, RLim, RCim, HopInfoim) into the route
reply message. Rim also stores the next hop of the forward
path (i.e. the identity of the RSU from which it receives the
route reply message) into its routing table for guiding Vi later
on.
Now let us go back to Rk, the RSU which initiates the route
searching process. Upon receiving a navigation reply, Rk will
not forward it to vehicle Vi immediately. Instead, it waits for
a threshold (which is a system parameter) amount of time for
more replies (possibly from RSUs on other directions). Rk
then performs the following:
• It verifies each RSU hop’s information (the verification
procedure is the same as the one used by vehicle Vi and
we will discuss the details in the next sub-section).
• It picks the travelling route that has the highest average
speed and does not contain any unusable road (e.g. those
totally blocked by a traffic accident).
• It then encrypts all RSU hops’ information using rand
and forwards it to vehicle Vi. Note that Rk includes nsn
into its message for Vi so that other vehicles nearby know
that they do not need to process the message.
G. Verification of RSUs’ hop information by vehicle tamper-
proof device
Recall that the reply contains a set of identities, a set of
locations, a set of certificates and a set of hop information
(average speed and road condition together with signatures),
each corresponding to an RSU along the route returned. To
verify the average speed and road condition provided by an
RSU, its signature is verified using its identity. In turn, to
verify an RSU’s real identity, its certificate has to be verified
using TA’s identity. Note that the verification process may
take excessive amount of time if carried out by a tamper-
proof device with today’s technology. As such, this part can
be relaxed to be carried out by a conventional car computer
device in order to speed up the process.
Vi’s tamper-proof device follows the following steps to
verify RSUs’ hop information:
• It first decrypts Rk’s reply using the stored rand.
• It then verifies RSUs’ certificates. Without
loss of generality, assume the RSUs along the
returned route have real identities RRIDfirst,
..., RRIDlast, locations RLfirst, ..., RLlast and
TA signatures TSIGTSK (RRIDfirst||RLfirst),
..., TSIGTSK(RRIDlast|| RLlast). Vehicle Vi
can then verify each of the (last − first + 1)
signatures (say signature TSIGTSK(RRIDi||RLi)
for the RSU located at RLi with real identity
RRIDi) by checking whether eˆ(TSIGTSK
(RRIDi||RLi), g) = eˆ(H(RRIDi||RLi), TRID)
Proof of correctness:
eˆ(TSIGTSK(RRIDi||RLi), g)
= eˆ(H(RRIDi||RLi)
TSK , g)
= eˆ(H(RRIDi||RLi), g
TSK)
= eˆ(H(RRIDi||RLi), TRID) 
• Next it verifies the signature by each of these (last −
first + 1) RSUs. Assume that these (last − first +
1) RSUs provide the average speeds AvgSpdfirst,
..., AvgSpdlast, road conditions RoadCondfirst, ...,
RoadCondlast together with signatures σfirst, ..., σlast.
Vehicle Vi verifies each of these signatures (say signature
σi corresponding to average speed AvgSpdi and road
condition RoadCondi) by checking whether eˆ(σi, g) =
eˆ(H(AvgSpdi||RoadCondi), RRIDi).
Proof of correctness:
eˆ(σi, g)
= eˆ(H(AvgSpdi||RoadCondi)
RSKi , g)
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9= eˆ(H(AvgSpdi||RoadCondi), g
RSKi)
= eˆ(H(AvgSpdi||RoadCondi), RRIDi) 
Note that for both verifications, vehicle Vi can actually
perform batch verification to save the number of pairing
operations. We will present the details in Section IX.
H. Guiding to destination by RSUs
Having the returned route, if Vi has GPS device installed and
it can receive GPS signals for current location, it can simply
search for each RSU based on the list of RLi. However, GPS
device is not an assumption of our scheme. Even if Vi does
not have GPS device installed, our scheme can make use of
the VANET to guide Vi to the destination.
To use the guiding service, Vi first gen-
erates a random number rand and sends <
RRIDk, AS ENCRRIDk (rand, nsn) > to Rk. Here
nsn is the navigation session number generated earlier and
Rk is the first RSU along the route.
Upon receiving the message from Vi, Rk performs three
simple steps:
• It decrypts the message using its private key to obtain
rand and nsn.
• It then searches its navigation routing table to dig out
the session with session number nsn and sends Vi
information (e.g. direction) about how to get to the next
RSU hop along the forward path (or the destination if it
is already the last hop).
• To avoid being eavesdropped by vehicles nearby, the
information is symmetrically encrypted by rand.
Vi repeats this process for each RSU hop along the route
until it reaches the destination desired.
I. Urgent change of route initiated by RSU
Road conditions vary abruptly. A road which is initially in
good condition may become blocked in a second. Thus our
scheme is designed in such a way that the querying vehicle Vi
will be informed about important changes in road conditions
along the returned route.
Assume RSU Rb is an RSU along the returned route.
Now if a road within its range is blocked, it imme-
diately composes the road blocking notification message
which is defined as Mb = {ROAD BLOCKED} and
sends {Mb, nsn,RRIDb, RLb, RCb, RSIGRRIDb(Mb)} to
the next RSU hop along the reverse path. The message
is propagated along the reverse path until an RSU that is
currently in contact with Vi is reached. That RSU forwards the
message to Vi. Again that RSU includes nsn into its message
for Vi so that other vehicles nearby know that they do not need
to process the message. Vi’s tamper-proof device then verifies
Rb’s certificate and signature using the methods in Section
V-G. After that, Vi can initiate a new navigation query to seek
for an alternative route.
J. Traceability of real identity by TA
With Vi’s pseudo identity V PIDi =
(V PIDi1, V PIDi2) = (g
r, V RIDi ⊕ h(g
r
pub)) and the
master secret s, TA can retrieve Vi’s real identity by
computing V RIDi = V PIDi2 ⊕ h(V PIDsi1).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we briefly analyze our scheme with respect
to the security requirements listed in Section III.
1) Message integrity and authentication: For both TA’s and
RSUs’ signatures, we adopt the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham
(BLS) signature scheme and its security has been proved
formally in [29]. Basically, TA’s signature on message
M is defined as H(M)TSK . Since TSK is only known
by TA, no others can forge the signature. Similarly, RSU
Rj’s signature on message M is defined as H(M)RSKj .
Again since RSKj is only known by Rj , no others can
forge the signature.
Vehicle Vi’s signature is composed of V SKi1 and
V SKi2. V SKi1 is defined as grs. We argue that if the
asymmetric encryption scheme AS ENCx(M) adopted
by us is secure and if Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem
is hard, then a vehicle’s message cannot be forged by
an attacker and our scheme is secure against existential
forgery, adaptive chosen message attack under random
oracle model. The proof is as follows.
An RSU transmits the value of s to a tamper-proof
device in encrypted form AS ENCCPKi(s) where
CPKi is the conventional public key of the vehicle
concerned and the corresponding conventional private
key CSKi is securely stored in its tamper-proof device.
This tamper-proof device does not provide any function
for outputting the values of CSKi or s and they are
used for internal operations only. Thus if the asymmet-
ric encryption scheme AS ENCx(M) we adopted is
secure, an attacker has no way to break the ciphertext
AS ENCCPKi(s) and obtain s. Note that the proxy
re-encryption scheme we adopted ensures that RSUs do
not know the value of s. Thus even an attacker collude
with any RSU, it cannot gain any advantage.
Next we show that if DH is hard, then a vehicle’s
message cannot be forged by an attacker and our scheme
is secure against existential forgery, adaptive chosen
message attack under random oracle model. The proof
can be found in Appendix I.
2) Identity privacy preserving: In this sub-section, we show
that an attacker cannot obtain a vehicle’s real identity
easily. Since the only information that is related to a
vehicle’s real identity and is exposed in the network is its
pseudo identity, we show that an attacker cannot obtain a
vehicle’s real identity even it is keeps its pseudo identity.
We argue that if Decision Diffie Hellman (DDH) prob-
lem is hard, then the pseudo identity of a vehicle can
preserve its real identity. The proof can be found in
Appendix II.
On the other hand, the random nonce r makes the pseudo
identity of a vehicle different in different messages. This
makes tracing the location of a particular vehicle over
time even more difficult.
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To conclude, to trace the real identity, one needs to
know the value of s but s is only known by all tamper-
proof devices and TA. A tamper-proof device (which can
prevent unauthorized parties from modifying its logic or
reading its stored data) is not supposed to carry out such
a traceability function. Thus no one except TA can trace
the real identity of a particular vehicle and privacy is
preserved.
3) Traceability: Section V-J shows that TA is able to trace
a vehicle’s real identity, thus traceability is satisfied.
4) Confidentiality: First we consider the anonymous cre-
dential. When vehicle Vi requests for a navigation cre-
dential from RSU Rj , it first picks a random number
rand and securely sends it to Rj . Rj in return encrypts
the encrypted credential using rand. Thus if the sym-
metrical encryption scheme S ENCx(M) we adopted
is secure, neighboring vehicles cannot illegally receive
the encrypted credential S ENCs(CT ) by eavesdrop-
ping messages from the air.
Similarly, when vehicle Vi requests for naviga-
tion service from RSU Rk, though the creden-
tial CT is going out of the tamper-proof de-
vice, it is included in the encrypted block <
AS ENCRRIDk (rand, nsn,CT ,Mi) >. Thus if the
asymmetrical encryption scheme AS ENCx(M) we
adopted is secure, neighboring vehicles cannot illegally
receive the credential CT by eavesdropping messages
from the air.
Next we consider the navigation query. Vi encrypts its
query using RSU’s identity (as included in the encrypted
block < AS ENCRRIDk(rand, nsn,CT ,Mi) >). If
the asymmetrical encryption scheme AS ENCx(M)
we adopted is secure, it is kept confidential from others.
Finally, we consider the navigation result. When vehicle
Vi requests for navigation service from RSU Rk, it picks
another random number and Rk in return encrypts the
navigation result using that random number. Again if
the symmetrical encryption scheme S ENCx(M) we
adopted is secure, no other vehicles can eavesdrop the
route even if they want to go to the same destination.
The profit of the operator is thus protected.
5) Unlinkability: As discussed in SectionV-E, we have
three approaches to avoid TA and RSUs linking up a
vehicle’s identity and navigation query sent by it. A
driver can pre-request a number of navigation credentials
before they are being used. On the other hand, after a
driver obtains an anonymous credential, it can present
it to the same RSU after a random time interval or to
a different RSU for navigation service. Note that the
anonymous credentials given to all vehicles are identical
within a period. Let us consider these approaches one
by one.
a) In the first approach, Vi pre-requests a number of
navigation credentials before they are being used.
Assume that there are credential requests from
N vehicles, the probability of linking a vehicle’s
pseudo identity and navigation query sent by it is
only 1/N .
b) In the second approach, Vi presents its navigation
query to the same RSU which it requests for
credential after a random delay. Assume that there
are credential requests from (N − 1) other vehi-
cles during this random period, the probability of
linking a vehicle’s pseudo identity and navigation
query sent by it is only 1/N .
c) In the third approach, Vi presents its navigation
query to another RSU. Since this later RSU does
not know Vi’s pseudo identity and identity ver-
ification is based on the anonymous credential,
it can link up Vi’s query with its identity only
if it colludes with TA. In that case, assume that
there are credential requests from N vehicles, the
probability of linking a vehicle’s pseudo identity
and navigation query sent by it is only 1/N .
Thus linkability can be minimized especially when more
vehicles use the navigation service.
VII. ANALYSIS ON TIME COMPLEXITY
In this section, we briefly analyze the time complexity of
our VSPN scheme. Note that we ignore the time complexity
involved in setup since it can be done offline and is only done
once occasionally (e.g. when TA wants to update the public
parameters). It is not critical to the efficiency of our VSPN
scheme.
We let Tmul denote the time required to perform one
point multiplication over an elliptic curve, Tmtp denote the
time required to perform one MapToPoint hash function [27],
and Tpar denote the time required to perform one pairing
operation. We further let Taenc, Tadec, Tsenc, Tsdec, Tcsig and
Trenc denote the time required to perform asymmetric encryp-
tion, asymmetric decryption, symmetric encryption, symmetric
decryption, conventional signature and reencryption operations
respectively. As argued by [7], these operations dominate the
speed of signature generation and signature verification, we
only consider the time taken by these operations and neglect
all others such as addition, scalar value manipulation and one-
way hash function. We consider the experiment in [30] for
an MNT curve [31] with embedding degree k = 6, G being
represented by 161 bits and order q being represented by 160
bits, on an Intel Pentium IV 3.0 GHz machine. The following
results are obtained: Tmul = Tmtp = 0.6 ms, Tpar = 4.5 ms.
Let us consider the steps in our VSPN scheme one by one.
According to Section V-B, TA takes Tmul + Tmtp + Tsenc
of time to generate the navigation credential for the current
period. According to Section V-C, vehicle Vi takes Tcsig of
time to sign the master key request message. Next the RSU
nearby takes Tmul + Tmtp of time to verify Vi’s certificate
and then takes Trenc of time to re-encrypt the master key
for Vi. According to Section V-D, when vehicle Vi requests
for an anonymous credential, it takes 5Tmul + 2Tmtp of time
for generating a signature (2 Tmul and 1 Tmtp for computing
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pseudo identity, 2 Tmul and 1 Tmtp for computing signing
key and 1 Tmul for computing signature). The RSU nearby
then takes 2Tpar + Tmtp + Tmul or 2Tpar + nTmtp + nTmul
of time for single or batch (n) signature verification. Finally,
the RSU takes 2Tsenc of time to encrypt the credential for
the current session for Vi. According to Section V-E, when
vehicle Vi requests for navigation service, it takes Taenc of
time to encrypt the request message. The RSU nearby then
takes Tadec of time to decrypt the message and then takes Tmtp
of time to verify the anonymous credential presented by Vi.
According to Section V-F, each RSU hop takes Tmul + Tmtp
of time to sign its hop information. According to Section V-G,
vehicle Vi takes 2Tmtp of time to verify each RSU hop’s
certificate and signature on hop information. According to
Section V-H, vehicle Vi takes Taenc of time to generate the
guiding service request message to an RSU nearby. According
to Section V-I, if a road within an RSU’s range is blocked,
that RSU takes Tmul + Tmtp of time to sign a road blocking
message. According to Section V-J, TA can trace a vehicle’s
real identity in Tmul of time.
VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate our VSPN scheme in terms of
processing delay (including those imposed by cryptographic
operations in our scheme) and the reduction in travelling time
using a network simulation program. Through simulation, we
show that the processing delay caused by our cryptographic
functions is minimal while the savings in travelling time after
using our scheme is significant. Note that since the generation
of anonymous credentials can be done separately offline, we
do not consider it in our simulation.
A. Simulation Models
In our simulation, we made use of two maps downloaded
from the TIGER database [32] - one is New York and the other
is California. New York represents a city road system (see Fig.
2 for the Google Map [33]) in which most roads have speed
limit of 50 km/h. California, on the other hand, represents a
countryside road system (see Fig. 3 for the Google Map [33])
in which some highways have speed limit up to 120 km/h.
For New York, we took 14498 roads into consideration and
placed 8477 RSUs onto them. For California, we took 11668
roads into consideration and placed 8948 RSUs onto them. The
RSUs are placed in such a way that there is at least one RSU
covering the two ends of each road since V2I communication
is more critical there. Other RSUs are then randomly placed
to improve the coverage. With the consideration of speeding
behavior, we assume New York has average vehicle speed
readings from 0 km/h (road blocking situation) to 70 km/h
(speeding situation) while California has average vehicle speed
readings from 0 km/h (highway blocking situation) to 140
km/h (speeding situation).
Some of the settings and parameters of our simulation
are adopted from [13], [7] and [16]. The RSU-to-Vehicle
Communication (RVC) and the Inter-Vehicle Communication
(IVC) ranges are set to 600 m and 300 m, respectively. In the
Fig. 2. City Road System in New York
Fig. 3. Countryside Highway System in California
backbone, there is a TA server. RSUs communicate with each
other and with TA via a fixed infrastructure. The bandwidth
of the DSRC channel and the fixed infrastructure are assumed
to be 6 Mb/s and 10 Mb/s, respectively. Regarding processing
time, following the experiment on an Intel Pentium IV 3.0
GHz computer in [30], we assume that each pairing operation
takes 4.5 ms and each point multiplication over an elliptic
curve takes 0.6 ms. Each conventional asymmetric encryption
takes 1.2 ms while each conventional symmetric encryption
takes only 0.6 ms. In our VSPN scheme, an RSU needs to
look up its routing table for forwarding direction. We assume
such look-up can be accomplished in 0.6 ms on average.
Following [13] and [7], the size of some message compo-
nents are fixed in our simulation: 42 bytes for pseudo identity,
21 bytes for ECC-type signature and 21 bytes for ECC-type
public key. We further fix the size of those components that are
newly introduced in our schemes: 5 bytes for control messages
like NVC REQ, 20 bytes for each representation of GPS
location, 255 bytes for timestamp and 10 bytes for random
number.
For each map, we define a fixed number of geographical
distance ranges. For each range, we randomly pick 60 sets
of sources and destinations that are within the geographical
distance range. We treat them as the current location and the
desired destination of a navigation querying vehicle respec-
tively. When the experiment starts, about 10% of all roads
are blocked. We only consider sources and destinations that
have roads connected and these roads are not blocked at this
time. Without loss of generality, we assume that a vehicle
requests for a navigation credential or sends out its navigation
query once it enters an RSU’s range (upon hearing its beacon
broadcasts). Since a vehicle can wait for a random delay
or travel for a random distance after obtaining a navigation
credential before sending out its navigation query, we define
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the processing time as the period from when the vehicle sends
out its navigation query to when it finishes verifying the
information provided by all RSUs along the returned path.
This processing time is then normalized by the duration that
the vehicle is in the range of the RSU to which it sends its
query. Here we assume the vehicle concerned keeps on moving
without being blocked by traffic jam or accident.
Besides processing time, we also introduce another termi-
nology known as worst case urgent notification time. Upon
a vehicle finding a route to a desired destination, we assume
that a road blocking condition suddenly appears and as a result,
the returned route can no longer be used. At that moment, the
RSU covering the destination immediately sends an urgent
notification message to the vehicle so that another route
request can be made. Hence we define the worst case urgent
notification time as the period from when the RSU covering
the destination sends out the urgent notification message to
when the vehicle finishes verifying the message. We claim
that this is the worst case because the distance between the
vehicle and the RSU concerned is the furthest at that time. To
compare it with the processing time, we normalize this urgent
notification time in the same way as before.
Next, we compare the travelling time of the route returned
by our scheme and that by the offline map data searching
approach (with and without the help of TMC service). The
route returned by the offline map data searching approach
is basically the shortest distance route. For the approach
with TMC service, a driver can make use of TMC broadcast
information to learn whether a returned route is blocked or
not.
For all the above, the data from 15 sets are averaged to
obtain a data point as shown in Fig. 4 to 7 below. Note that
in all the figures, we abstract a range along the x-axis by its
middle point (i.e. its class mark).
Besides processing delay, worst case urgent notification time
and travelling time, we also evaluate the route blocking rate.
For each range, we randomly pick 100 sets of sources and
destinations that are within the geographical distance range.
Different from before, we consider sources and destinations
that have roads connected but these roads can be blocked when
the experiment starts. Among the 100 cases, we evaluate the
probability that the querying vehicle cannot reach the desired
destination (i.e. the route found is indeed blocked and can
cause a long travelling delay) by using our VSPN scheme and
the offline map data searching approach (with and without the
help of TMC service).
B. Simulation Results
In the first set of experiments, we consider the map of New
York. We consider 20 geographical distance ranges of 1 km
each. That is, the closest source and destination we pick are
only 1 km apart while the furthest are 20 km.
From Fig. 4, we can see that the processing time increases
with geographical distance. When the source and the desti-
nation nodes are further away, more RSU hops are involved.
This not only leads to more RSU signing operations but also
more pairing operations at the vehicles in the verification
phase. Nevertheless, among all geographical distance ranges,
the processing time is less than 1.4 % of the duration that
the vehicle stays in the querying RSU’s range. Thus there is
sufficient time for the vehicle to finish its navigation query
and to verify the result. The same figure also shows the worst
case urgent notification time. Among all geographical distance
ranges, the worst case urgent notification time is less than 0.1
% of the duration that the vehicle stays in the querying RSU’s
range. Thus even if a returned route is found blocked, there
is sufficient time for the vehicle to request for an alternative
route.
Fig. 4. Normalized Processing Time and Worst Case Urgent Notification
Time vs. Geographical Distance (New York)
Fig. 5 shows the travelling time comparison between our
VSPN scheme and offline map data searching approaches.
As the geographical distance increases, the travelling time
increases under both schemes. For all geographical distance
ranges, the travelling route returned by our VSPN scheme
gives lower delay than that returned by the offline map data
checking approach (even with the help of TMC service). The
gap increases as the displacement increases. The difference
can be up to 13 minutes (a gain of 39 %).
Fig. 5. Travelling Time vs. Geographical Distance (New York)
The route blocking rate is shown in Fig. 6. Interestingly
for all 20 geographical distance ranges, the offline map data
searching approach without the help of TMC service gives
much higher blocking rate than our VSPN scheme and the
approach with the help of TMC service. The reason is that
offline map data searching does not consider real time road
conditions at all and the returned route is only geographically
shortest. With the help of TMC service, the blocking rate
becomes comparable to ours.
In the second set of experiments, we consider the map of
California. We consider 16 geographical distance ranges of 5
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Fig. 6. Route Blocking Rate vs. Geographical Distance (New York)
km each. That is, the closest source and destination we pick
are 5 km apart while the furthest are 80 km.
From Fig. 7, we can see that as the geographical distance
increases, the processing time increases. The reason is the
same as in the New York case. Nevertheless, even for the
furthest source and destination points, the processing time is
only 3.3 % of the duration that the vehicle stays in the querying
RSU’s range. Thus there is sufficient time for the vehicle to
finish the navigation query and to verify the returning result.
The same figure also shows the worst case urgent notification
time. Among all geographical distance ranges, the worst case
urgent notification time is only less than 0.3 % of the duration
that the vehicle stays in the querying RSU’s range. Thus even
a returned route is found blocked finally, there is sufficient
time for the vehicle to request for an alternative route. Since
roads in California are longer than those in New York, the
processing time and urgent notification time for the California
case are double that for the New York case.
Fig. 7. Normalized Processing Time and Worst Case Urgent Notification
Time vs. Geographical Distance (California)
From Fig. 8, we can see that the travelling time increases
with geographical distance. For all geographical distance
ranges, the travelling route returned by our VSPN scheme
gives lower delay than that returned by the offline map
database checking approach (even with the help of TMC
service). The gap can be up to 33 minutes (a gain of 55 %).
Again since roads in California are longer than those in New
York, the travelling time for the California case is double that
for the New York case.
The route blocking rate is shown in Fig. 9. Interestingly
for all 16 geographical distance ranges, the offline map data
searching approach without the help of TMC service gives
much higher blocking rate than our VSPN scheme and the
approach with the help of TMC service. As in the New York
case, with the help of TMC service, the blocking rate becomes
comparable to ours.
Fig. 8. Travelling Time vs. Geographical Distance (California)
Fig. 9. Route Blocking Rate vs. Geographical Distance (California)
IX. BATCH VERIFICATION APPROACH
In this section, we discuss how batch verification can be
done when a vehicle needs to verify a set of RSUs in Section
V-G.
Let us reconsider how the RSUs’ certificates can be veri-
fied. Without loss of generality, assume the RSUs along the
returned route have real identities RRIDfirst, ..., RRIDlast,
locations RLfirst, ..., RLlast and TA signatures TSIGTSK
(RRIDfirst||RLfirst), ..., TSIGTSK(RRIDlast||RLlast).
Vehicle Vi can then verify the (last − first + 1) signa-
tures in a batch by checking whether eˆ(
∏last
i=first TSIGTSK
(RRIDi||RLi), g)
= eˆ(
∏last
i=first H(RRIDi||RLi), TRID)
Proof of correctness:
eˆ(
∏last
i=first TSIGTSK(RRIDi||RLi), g)
= eˆ(
∏last
i=first H(RRIDi||RLi)
TSK , g)
= eˆ((
∏last
i=first H(RRIDi||RLi))
TSK , g)
= eˆ(
∏last
i=first H(RRIDi||RLi), g
TSK)
= eˆ(
∏last
i=first H(RRIDi||RLi), TRID) 
Further assume these (last− first + 1) RSUs provide the
average speeds AvgSpdfirst, ..., AvgSpdlast, road conditions
RoadCondfirst, ..., RoadCondlast together with signatures
(Ufirst,Wfirst), ..., (Ulast,Wlast). Vehicle Vi verifies these
signatures in a batch by checking whether eˆ(
∏last
i=first σi, g) =∏last
i=first eˆ(H(AvgSpdi||RoadCondi), RRIDi).
Proof of correctness:
eˆ(
∏last
i=first σi, g)
=
∏last
i=first eˆ(σi, g)
=
∏last
i=first eˆ(H(AvgSpdi||RoadCondi)
RSKi , g)
=
∏last
i=first eˆ(H(AvgSpdi||RoadCondi), g
RSKi)
=
∏last
i=first eˆ(H(AvgSpdi||RoadCondi), RRIDi) 
We can see that with batch verification, vehicle Vi needs to
perform only 2 pairing operations to verify the certificates of
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTERS
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication.
14
all RSUs. For the message verification, since the signatures
are generated by different RSUs, altogether (last−first+2)
pairing operations are needed.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a VANET-based Secure and Privacy-
preserving Navigation (VSPN) scheme in this paper. We
utilized speed data and road conditions collected by RSUs to
guide vehicles to desired destinations in a distributed manner.
Our scheme adopts some security primitives in a non-trivial
way to provide a number of security features: 1) Vehicles are
authenticated by means of pseudo identities. 2) Navigation
queries and results are protected from eavesdroppers. Besides,
with the idea of anonymous credential, no one including TA
can link up a vehicle’s navigation query and its identity. 3)
Information provided by RSUs can be properly authenticated
before the route is actually being used. Besides satisfying all
security and privacy requirements, our solution is efficient in
the sense that a vehicle can complete the whole navigation
querying process and receive urgent notification in a very short
time. On the other hand, the route returned by our scheme
can lead to savings of up to 55% of travelling time compared
with the offline map data searching approach. Our scheme
also gives lower route blocking rate in practice. Note that
our VSPN scheme can apply to the situation where the route
searching process is done by a central server, which collects
and verifies speed data and road conditions from RSUs. The
authentication process at vehicles can be even simpler because
a vehicle only needs to check against the central server’s
signature on the processed result. However, such a centralized
approach is not scalable, especially for large cities. We are
implementing our VSPN scheme on a testbed to further verify
its performance.
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